The Arab Spring on Trial
Human Rights in the Arab Region 2014
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The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies is issuing this brief report on the status of human rights in the Arab world in 2014. The CIHRS was unable to publish its detailed annual human rights report this year, as it has every year since 2008, due to the unprecedented security pressures and threats facing its staff and administration in Egypt. As a result of these, the CIHRS was compelled to move its regional and international programs to Tunisia in December 2014. CIHRS will resume its full reporting in the coming year.

This brief analysis is based primarily on the conclusions found in national reports and background papers prepared by a team of researchers on human rights developments in the Arab states in 2014. The CIHRS wishes to express its gratitude to these researchers, who include Ahmed Ali Ibrahim, Essam Eldin Mohamed Hassan Ismail Abdel Hamid, Kholoud Hafez, Mohamed Omran, Salah Nasrawi. This report was edited by Moataz al-Fegeiri, with an introduction by Bahey eldin Hassan.
Introduction

The Arab world in 2014 witnessed an unprecedented deterioration of the human rights situation, as detailed by the annual report in brief issued by the CIHRS. This had catastrophic human consequences by any measure, demonstrated in the extraordinary numbers of refugees, internally displaced persons, and illegal migrants.

Unfortunately, there are no indications that this decline will be checked in 2015, for the factors and forces responsible for it persist. In fact, we may see further deterioration, more severe humanitarian tragedies, the disintegration of additional states, and the magnification of threats that go beyond the Arab world to threaten international peace and security.

The Arab Spring is not the cause of this alarming decline. On the contrary, the Arab Spring was the last serious attempt by peoples of the region to correct course, but destructive powers and forces proved stronger than the forces for reform and change, on both the national and regional levels. For its part, the international community failed to rise to the challenges and complexities of this historical moment. The opportunity was missed and all parties have paid and will continue to pay an exorbitant price, which will only grow steeper with time if the national, regional, and international incapacitation continues.

Undoubtedly, the most significant event of 2014 was the qualitative development in the forces of terrorism, marked by the birth of the first terrorist “state” in history. This historical event is also not one of the fruits of the Arab Spring, but rather the consequence of 14 years of failure to combat terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the pursuit of a skewed, one-dimensional counterterrorism strategy that relies
solely on security and military approaches, ignores the political, social, and religious roots of terrorism, and sacrifices human rights. It is also the result of decades of the systematic destruction in many countries of the pillars of the modern state, established in the Arab world in the early 20th century, which has gradually turned these states into primitive semblances of their modern selves: a collection of neighboring tribes, sects, and ethnic communities brought to heel and made to coexist by the most heinous means under the hegemony of a particular sectarian, ethnic, or political group. The means used to accomplish this include killing, rape, torture, plunder, and mass displacement. In the absence of any legal or constitutional order worthy of the name and uncorrupted institutions that strive to ensure a modicum of justice, non-discrimination, fairness, and social justice, and in the face of cruel, unjust practices founded on discrimination based on religious, ethnic, or political identity, entire societies have been debilitated and become prey to mass, seemingly unlimited depredations. In Syria and Iraq, civilians are subjected to chemical barrages, aerial bombing or shelling with heavy artillery, and most recently barrel bombs. These victimized communities have thus disavowed the nation-state and prioritized escaping from its hell, if not through suicide or flight into exile, then by looking for a savior or protector from outside the state, which makes itself felt only in the form of security or military gangs that hold no life sacred. No one wonders any more where Godot is coming from—the important thing is that he comes, even if it as a mirage that offers only brief respite from the terrors of a holocaust, from inside the region (Iran or Saudi Arabia), outside (the UN or NATO), or even from a terrorist group like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS). This is currently the situation in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon, with other countries on the way.

When the real history of the Arab world is written, it will record how these peoples suffered the afflictions of the old imperialism in the first half of the 20th century only to face similar tribulations from national independence governments in the second half of that century and then the new imperialists of the early part of the millennium in the form of the US invasion of Iraq and its fallout. Segments of Sunnis in Iraq and Syria found in al-Qaeda and IS some refuge from the massive injustices crushing them every day, while segments of Shia populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq look to Iran to rescue them from the obliteration of their identity. Other groups seek instead to entrench a discriminatory monopoly of power, wealth, and influence at the expense of other sects or ethnicities, while the most vulnerable sectarian and ethnic minorities look toward the old imperialists or another savior, even if they come from Mars. Even before this, minorities and majorities lost all hope in the humanity and reason of the regimes in their countries. This is not the fruit of the Arab Spring, but a consequence of the uninterrupted, 50-year rule of security and military elites in the Arab world.
In an interview with CNN, King Abdullah II of Jordan said that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had avoided striking at IS from the beginning, choosing instead to strike less extreme and even non-Islamist opposition factions. The king interpreted this as the Syrian’s regime strategic desire to preserve a faction that seemed worse, more cruel than itself, which might help alleviate international pressure and even prompt a reconsideration of the demand that Assad go. In fact, a role might be found for him in any future resolution of the Syrian conflict. But by following the various fronts of the civil war in Syria, it is clear that IS concluded that this strategy served its own interests as well. It has also avoided military engagements with Assad, dedicating its efforts to the same forces that are Assad’s prime military and political targets. It is the Assad regime’s double, its twin.

The accusation leveled by the Jordanian king at Assad is not limited to the latter. It applies to so many others whose longevity in power would be difficult to imagine were it not for their double—the uglier, even more vicious party. Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen and one of the most prominent members of the Arab security-military elite, realized this early on. While he assisted the US in its war against al-Qaeda in Yemen, he did not seek a decisive victory over it, for were it not for al-Qaeda, his rule may not have lasted for nearly a quarter century. The current regime in Egypt also needs to prove that terrorism is the principal threat it faces rather than social forces hostile to extremism and terrorism. The increasing victims of terrorism—civilians and military personnel—indicates however that terrorism is not receiving a response proportionate to its danger, especially when viewed against the exponential increase in the number of peaceful political activists, Islamists and secularists, who have been arrested and prosecuted in politicized, unfair trials, who now number in the tens of thousands.

These twins’ existential need for one another—like Assad and IS—does not preclude—in fact, it requires—a constant, hostile media discourse against the other, each treating the other party as its primary and most dangerous foe. But behind the smoke of the eliminationist media rhetoric, both parties—IS and the Syrian security and military ruling elite—offer vital support to each other’s machinery of war. This includes Assad’s barrel bombs: IS sells the Syrian government petroleum, taken from wells in the areas it has seized, at lower-than-market prices in exchange for the funds needed to buy vital equipment for its own war machinery.

For various reasons, Morocco and Tunisia have thus far evaded these bleak scenarios. The ruling and opposition elite in Morocco embarked early, in the late 1990s, on a process of political and social repair and dealing with the past, which was no less brutal than others. Were it not for this, Morocco may have gone down the Syrian or Iraqi path. The Tunisian uprising avoided the sad fate of Egypt thanks to the modest political aspirations of its military elite, their professionalism, the dynamism of civil society in political and
union activity, and the openness and pragmatism of the Islamist Ennahda movement. This enabled it to learn the lessons of the political fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in time.

The advocates of the Arab Spring in Egypt did not demand the release of terrorist leaders from prison after the January 25 uprising. On the contrary, they were released just a few months after the uprising by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which assumed the reins of control when President Mubarak stepped down and many of whose most prominent leaders have run Egypt since July 3, 2013. These releases, for which no official explanation has been forthcoming thus far, took place while demonstrations by the most extreme Islamist groups in Egypt were occupying Tahrir Square demanding that the head of SCAF be appointed the commander of the country. After their release, most of these leaders went to Sinai.

Meanwhile, SCAF leaders, in collusion with the Muslim Brotherhood, launched a major smear campaign against the liberal April 6 movement, followed by campaigns against other secular activists and then massacred Coptic and non-Islamist assemblies in the streets and squares of Cairo. Before the end of 2011, there were unprecedented military raids on the offices of several Egyptian and international human rights organizations. About seven months later, terrorist groups launched their first major offensive in Sinai, on August 7, 2012, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers and seizing two armed personnel carriers. In the next two years, acts of violence and political retaliation increased in most Egyptian cities, as did terrorist attacks in Sinai. Meanwhile, in this same period, the security authorities and media and judicial circles escalated their attack on youth activists, Islamists and secularists, and then on independent human rights organizations to a level not seen since the founding of human rights groups in Egypt three decades earlier. There are profound differences between the political situation in Syria and Egypt, but the similarities are clear to those who can see.

Given common Israeli and Egyptian interests in countering terrorism, the current regime in Cairo is betting on the effectiveness of Israeli military support in Sinai\(^1\) and on the Israeli lobby in Washington. This comes at the expense of mobilizing Egyptian societal forces opposed to violence and terrorism—or at least, it has not brought an end to the crackdown on them—including the Bedouin community in Sinai, which faces deeply entrenched political, security, economic, and social injustices and severe structural discrimination. The institutional discrimination is largely based on the firm, long-held distrust of the Bedouin’s national loyalties among the Egyptian security and military elite. It is supremely ironic that the Egyptian regime continues to nurse such baseless suspicions of its own citizens in Sinai while putting its faith in the party that

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\(^1\)The Israeli media has spoken of the multiple forms of this support, without any statement of denial from the Egyptian authorities
is ostensibly competing for Bedouin Egyptians’ loyalty: Israel. The Egyptian regime’s exaggerated confidence in Israel is based on an illusion that makes their current and future interests nearly identical.

Until the Palestinian issue is resolved, Israel’s supreme strategic interest remains keeping the largest Arab army perpetually occupied with another conflict, whether in Sinai, Libya, the Gulf, or Yemen. Of course, it is not in Israel’s interest for terrorism to win in Sinai, but it is certainly also not in its interest for Egypt to score a decisive victory over it, especially since thanks to terrorism, the Israeli Defense Forces have returned to Sinai yet again. On the day that Egypt defeats terrorism in Sinai, Israel and those that invited it will lose the justification, and it will need to withdraw behind its own borders yet again, which is not what Israel seeks.

Like many Arab governments, Israel makes pragmatic, manifold, ever-changing calculations. However contradictory they may appear, they ultimately serve—unlike Arab governments—the interests of the people that alone has the right to call it to account and remove it. While it assists Egypt against terrorism in Sinai, Israel is also moving wounded fighters with Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s franchise in Syria—to Israeli military hospitals for treatment before again returning them to their bases where they can continue the fight against the Assad regime. This is the government supported by the Egyptian regime. And while the Muslim Brotherhood and its international organization is the number one enemy of Egypt’s current rulers, its subsidiary in Yemen is an official ally in the Decisive Storm coalition, which also includes Egypt. Meanwhile, when it launched its military operations in Yemen, Saudi Arabia announced that al-Qaeda and IS are not among its military targets, even as Egyptian civilians and soldiers are killed every day in attacks by branches of these two groups in Egypt.

This anarchy is not the doing of the Arab Spring. It was born before the uprisings, in states so tattered nothing remains but their name and a flag planted atop the ruins by what remains of the corrupt security and military elite. Meanwhile, millions of their inhabitants wander aimlessly looking for another home, even if it is a grave in the depths of the Mediterranean Sea.

In Samuel Beckett’s absurdist play, Godot never comes. But in the Arab reality—more absurd than anything Beckett could imagine—Godot comes, to find waiting for him the same military and security elite and their twin brothers, the armies of religious extremism and terrorism nurtured in the breasts of this elite.

_Bahey eldin Hassan_
Brief Report

Status of Human Rights in the Arab Region in 2014
Political context of the human rights situation in the Arab region

The crisis of human rights in the Arab region continued to worsen in 2014 as numerous countries in the region witnessed severe, systematic, widespread violations, including extrajudicial killing, torture, enforced disappearance, long-term arbitrary detention, unfair trials often ending in death sentences or long prison terms, forced displacement, and the systematic persecution of religious minorities. These crimes amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity in some countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and the occupied Palestinian territory. This bleak picture is the natural outcome of the failure of the political transitions that followed the uprisings collectively dubbed “the Arab Spring.” Domestic and region-wide counterrevolutions successfully quashed and distorted these uprisings, retaliating against their popular symbols. At the same time, regimes that were untouched by revolutions mounted fierce resistance to the advocates of political reform and social justice, taking preventive security measures to counter demands for political and social reform.

The human rights crisis in some countries was compounded by the failure of political forces to peacefully manage conflict and increasing political and sectarian polarization, as domestic forces in some states used violence and military approaches to resolve these conflicts. The internal crises of regional states over the past five years highlights the flagrant failure of these states throughout their history to come to terms with political, religious, and ethnic diversity. The mismanagement of diversity has typically provoked existential conflicts within states in which it is seen to undermine social and institutional structures. The Arab Spring did not alter this reality, but rather exposed the inability of the dominant ideologies of the past few decades to produce a model capable of establishing a constitutional and institutional order based on respect for diversity and its peaceful management.

Conflicting geostrategic interests and the polarization of regional forces such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Qatar, Israel and Turkey also contributed greatly to the thwarting of the Arab revolutions. The ruling elite in these states saw the Arab Spring either as a direct threat or an opportunity to advance their interests and regional ambitions by enabling certain political currents to control governance in Arab Spring countries. These forces thus sought to direct the course of political transitions using financial and military tools, and internal conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya were turned into proxy wars between these regional powers.

This was accompanied by an unprecedented spike in activity by violent jihadi organizations. The most prominent event of 2014 was that the Islamic State (IS, also
known as ISIS or ISIL) managed to extend its actual control to important geographic regions in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which strengthened its recruiting and weapons capacities. IS brutally and publicly murdered its opponents and Arab and foreign hostages who fell into its grasp. Numerous jihadi groups in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and North Africa declared their fealty to IS and its leaders and began actively engaging in acts of violence in the Arab region and several European nations. These organizations managed to attract fighters to their ranks from all over the world. They are committed to the use of excessive violence against both rulers and society in order to establish what they call Islamic rule based on the application of Islamic law (sharia), with their intellectual references combining traditionalism and modernity. These groups offer readings of scripture that rely on the most extreme interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, while their political theories of the Islamic state and the sovereignty of Islamic law are grounded in modern concepts wholly unrelated to the historical development of Islamic societies or Islamic law.\(^1\)

The prevalent Islamic discourse, fostered internationally and regionally by several governments in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi institutions and official Islamic institutions such as al-Azhar, reinforces rather than contains this jihadi current. These governments are the same ones currently waging security campaigns in cooperation with Western states to counter terrorism and religious extremism. For example, while Saudi Arabia condemned the terrorist attack by jihadis against Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015, in which al-Qaeda assailed the magazine for mocking Islam, the Saudi authorities were carrying out the cruel sentence of lashing against blogger and rights activist Raif Badawi, who had been convicted of mocking Islam. Badawi had criticized the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saudi religious police. Saudi Arabia also continues to carry out death sentences in public, decapitating convicted persons in the name of applying Islamic law.

Meanwhile, the political use of jihadi groups, or selectively turning a blind eye to their activities, is an old tactic favored by several regimes in the area to shore up their own position and legitimacy to govern and extract cooperation from international forces by pointing to themselves as the only alternative to these terrorist groups.\(^2\) Yet, the overwhelming focus on security and military-based approaches to terrorist organizations has proved an abject failure. The growth of jihadi organizations in the region cannot be separated from the factors promoting the turn to violence, first and foremost political despotism and economic and social marginalization. Sectarian discrimination is also a cause of religious violence. For example, the policies of successive Iraqi governments

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since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime have marginalized and fostered violence against Iraqi Sunnis, which in turn promoted the rapid growth of IS and enhanced its ability to attract supporters among Sunni currents.

With the exception of Tunisia, all hopes of a democratic transition in Arab Spring countries have dissipated. In Egypt, since the army ousted President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government on July 3, 2013, the military establishment has played a pivotal role in establishing a new authoritarian regime whose modes of repression are even more draconian than those common in the era of former President Hosni Mubarak. Killing, enforced disappearance, and the use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins have all increased enormously since July 2013. President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the former defense minister, was elected in June 2014 in a presidential poll conducted in a climate of intimidation and amid the exclusion of civil society and opposition political forces, Islamist and non-Islamist. The regime has embarked on a campaign of revenge against everything and everyone related to the revolution of January 25, 2011, employing a series of repressive laws to imprison the leaders and symbols of the revolution, especially youth leaders. In 2014, the regime took practical steps aimed at eliminating the independent human rights movement in Egypt, harassing and persecuting human rights defenders.

To buttress his legitimacy, the Egyptian president has exploited Egyptians’ rising fears of violence, terrorism, and state collapse, but conditions in the country demonstrate that systematic human rights violations and the erosion of justice cannot contain the escalating violence in Sinai and various areas of Egypt. On the contrary, the naked security approach, the blocking of all outlets for peaceful political action, and increasing grievances against the state and its security and judicial establishments have only spurred new elements, especially among youth, to join the ranks of terrorist groups in or out of Egypt. The positive features enshrined in the amended constitution of 2014 have become meaningless amid the blatant politicization of the judiciary and the executive authority’s ravaging of civil rights and liberties. The legislative elections continue to be postponed while the president uses to his unilateral powers unchecked to issue laws that infringe constitutional rights.

Several countries in the region continued to witness internal civil strife and the breakdown of state institutions, at exorbitant human cost. According to the UN, there are more refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East and North Africa than any time since World War II. There are currently 4 million refugees from Syria and 2 million from Libya; it is estimated that there are more than 7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria and some 1.8 million in Iraq, many of them forced to flee from the brutality of IS and rising sectarian violence. Libya has 140,000 IDPs, while Yemen had
335,000 as of September 2014. Many refugees are hosted in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia, but since these countries lack legal frameworks to protect refugee rights, many of those fleeing armed violence in Syria, Libya, and Yemen find themselves facing security sieges of a different type in host countries. In fact, some have been subject to retaliatory acts as a result of the rising rhetoric of incitement in host countries, while others have been arrested or refouled to their home countries. Thousands of people fleeing their countries as a result of wars and persecution are now willing to risk their lives on the Mediterranean to illegally migrate to Europe.

The armed conflict in Syria entered its fourth year expanding in scope, with catastrophic human consequences. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime carries the biggest responsibility for widespread crimes against civilians in Syria. His government continued to launch indiscriminate, disproportional attacks on civilian areas such as Aleppo, Deraa, and the Damascus countryside, using banned weapons such as barrel bombs and setting siege to entire cities, causing famines among inhabitants. The Syrian authorities also continued to arbitrarily detain thousands of civilians and engage in systematic torture. Opposition militias are similarly implicated in crimes against civilians. The last two years have seen a growing regional influence of jihadi groups such as IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which have also entered the armed conflict against the Syrian regime and against other Syrian factions that differ in doctrine and ideology. These jihadi groups have committed heinous crimes against civilians and religious minorities, including murder, public execution, and abduction, as well as crimes of violence against and the abduction of women.

In Libya, two governments battle for control of the country. In Tripoli, where the National Salvation government is based, an alliance of militias from Misrata and other cities in western Libya, side by side with Islamists, managed to take control of the airport and ministries in the name of General National Congress, which refused to turn over their missions to the elected parliament. In Tobruk, the elected parliament has convened and formed a provisional government. Armed battles have been fought between the two sides since mid-2014, in tandem with increased activity by violent jihadi groups such as IS, which controls the city of Derna in eastern Libya. The violence and crimes committed in Libya amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, while various Libyan authorities and the international community have thus far failed to protect civilians against violations committed by various militias on the ground.

In Yemen, the arrangement for the rotation of power reached between domestic political forces under Gulf auspices in 2012 and the subsequent national dialogue made no progress in democratization, the improvement of the human rights situation, or ending the armed conflicts in various parts of the country. The transitional government
led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi failed to address the manifold political and economic challenges facing the country, while the armed conflict between the central government and armed Zaydi Houthis continued, with both sides committing grave human rights abuses. The Houthis, allied with supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, scored remarkable field victories in late 2014, prompting the transitional government in 2015 to call in Saudi-led Arab forces to stop the Houthi advance. Saudi military intervention has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. As of mid-2015, some 4,000 people have been killed, most of them civilians, while some 21 million people—upwards of 80 percent of the Yemeni population—are in dire need of emergency humanitarian aid.

The year opened on extremely poor security and political conditions in Iraq, which by mid-year had thrown the country into a sectarian civil war and ethnic conflict mirroring the division of society on the ground—a long-feared outcome of the country’s chronic political crises and security vacuum since the American invasion of 2003. Terrorist attacks were a major cause of Iraqis’ sufferings in 2014, when casualties, the dead and wounded, exceeded those of 2011 and 2013. At mid-year, a catastrophic development came when IS took control of several Iraqi cities, subsequently announcing the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and imposing strict laws on public conduct and private behavior. IS engaged in religious cleansing against religious minorities and what it views as heretical sects, such as the Shia.

The failed political transitions in Arab Spring countries encouraged regimes in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Jordan—hostile to the uprisings since the beginning—to take measures to prevent the emergence of any popular political movement in their own territories. Although Morocco has adopted a number of important constitutional, legislative, and institutional reforms since 2011, the Moroccan authorities’ tolerance for freedom of opinion and expression and its respect for the freedom and independence of human rights defenders began to wane markedly in 2014, keeping apace with the security policies and measures taken by numerous Arab states since 2013 to neutralize demands for political reform and economic and social rights and demonstrating the tendency to use terrorism and security threats as a pretext to undermine human rights. Nevertheless, Morocco took a positive step in December 2014 when the king approved Law 13/108 amending the jurisdiction of the military courts. The law limited the courts’ jurisdiction over civilians to wartime only. Although the new law required all prosecutions of civilians before military courts, including those pending, to be referred to ordinary courts, a military court continued to try civilians, one of them a Sahrawi rights activist Mbarak Daoudi.
The deterioration of the human rights situation in Lebanon was related to regional political developments, particularly the armed conflict in Syria and the intensified activity of violent religious groups in the Levant, as well as Hezbollah’s political and military support of the Syrian regime. In 2013 and 2014, several areas in Lebanon suffered terrorist, sectarian-related bombings. The growing sectarian and political polarization led to numerous internal divisions and paralyzed constitutional and governmental institutions, a major consequence of which was the postponement of parliamentary elections and the failure to elect a new Lebanese president.

In Sudan, the regime of President Omar al-Bashir engaged in the systematic suppression of peaceful assemblies and demonstrations, tightened press censorship, and arrested and prosecuted human rights activists. At the same time, the human consequences of the armed conflicts in Darfur in western Sudan, southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile continue to be felt in the form of civilian deaths and a growing number of displaced persons. In 2014, more than half a million people were uprooted due to renewed conflict, which included the aerial shelling of inhabited areas and land offenses in Darfur.

In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to a fourth term in April 2014 in non-competitive elections boycotted by numerous opposition parties and groups. The authorities systematically repressed peaceful protests, and several human rights activists and trade union leaders faced charges for exercising their right of peaceful assembly, supporting demonstrations, or engaging in labor strikes. The authorities continue to restrict civil society institutions and unions.

Tunisia offered the only example of the staying power of the Arab Spring. In 2014, Islamist and non-Islamist factions, supported by civil society, overcame their political and ideological differences and moved ahead with democratization. The country adopted a new, consensual constitution that upholds civil rights and liberties and conducted fair, competitive parliamentary and presidential elections with the participation of various Tunisian political forces, observed by local and international civil society. Challenges remain, however, to further democratization, first and foremost the growing political influence of elements linked to the authoritarian regime of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, which may impede the process of transitional justice begun in Tunisia in 2014. In addition, increasing terrorist attacks by jihadi groups may give some anti-democratic forces in the country the pretext to curtail civil liberties, especially in light of long-delayed fundamental reforms to the security sector and the judiciary.
Most widespread types of human rights violations

*Extrajudicial killing on the rise amid systematic impunity for offenders*

The increasing involvement of states and paramilitary groups in extrajudicial killing is the most important symptom of the deterioration of human rights in the Arab world over the last two years. Such killing is on the rise given the armed conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan, where attacks on civilians are just one weapon used by the warring parties every day. Some 220,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict in Syria, and the international community is still unable to take decisive measures to prevent the targeting of civilians. Most governments in the region use lethal force to confront popular protests or peaceful sit-ins, as seen in Egypt, Bahrain, Sudan, and Algeria. In Egypt, since President Morsi was deposed in July 2013, the security services and army have been implicated in extensive assaults on the supporters of the ousted president and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in the deaths of more than a thousand of Egyptians. The violence has extended to any popular protest against the ruling authorities, and state authorities have taken no measures to hold those responsible for these crimes to account.

*Systematic suppression of the human rights movement and civil society*

Human rights defenders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sudan, and Algeria were subjected to systematic persecution and arbitrary restrictions on their right of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in 2014. In these countries, activists were repeatedly prosecuted on charges related to their peaceful activities in defense of human rights. Many of these trials ended with harsh prison sentences and, in Saudi Arabia, corporal punishment, while travel bans were increasingly applied. States in the region issued more legislation to curtail the free work of human rights advocates, including laws to protect state security abroad and at home, to increase penalties for accepting foreign funding, and to restrict freedom of expression on the internet. In addition, laws were adopted restricting the right to form civic associations and organize peaceful assemblies and demonstrations.

In Egypt, lawyer Yara Sallam, of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, along with 23 other young activists, among them Sanaa Seif of the No Military Trials group, were sentenced to two years in prison for breaking the protest law. Activist Alaa Abd El Fattah was sentenced to five years in prison and fined LE100,000 in connection with a demonstration in front of the Shura Council in November 2013, held to protest the prosecution of civilians before military tribunals. The Egyptian authorities and their loyal media outlets stepped up their campaigns of incitement against human rights
organizations, accusing them of treason and collaboration with foreign powers. In July 2014, the government warned human rights groups that they needed to register and operate under the repressive Law 84/2002 regulating NGOs or face dissolution and the prosecution of their leaders. The state took measures starting in 2015 to investigate several rights groups, among them the Egyptian Democracy Academy and the CIHRS, on charges related to illegal foreign funding and establishing unlawful associations. Human rights defenders in Egypt were increasingly threatened with prison and, occasionally, death, and the repeated imposition of arbitrary travel bans prompted several prominent human rights defenders to leave the country and spurred a number of organizations to curtail their activities.

In Bahrain, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, the president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and one of the most prominent human rights defenders in Bahrain, has been in prison since April 2011; in June of that year, he was sentenced to life imprisonment following an unfair military trial on charges of terrorism and attempting to overthrow the regime. Nabeel Rajab, the founder of the Bahrain Center for Human rights and the Gulf Center for Human Rights, has faced continued harassment since 2012. He was released from prison in May 2014 after serving two years for unlawful protest, but was again investigated in October of the same year on charges of insulting state institutions after posting critical comments on Twitter. He was banned from travel and sentenced to six months in prison in January 2015. In April, he was investigated yet again on charges of insulting the Interior Ministry and publishing false news.

In Saudi Arabia in May 2014, blogger and rights activist Raif Badawi was sentenced to ten years in prison, 1,000 lashes, and fined one million Saudi riyals; he was also banned from travel for ten years and prohibited from writing online. The sentence came after he was convicted of showing contempt for Islam for critical media remarks he made regarding the practices of the Committee for the Protection of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, known as the religious police. The lashing sentence began to be carried out in January 2015. Also in January, lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair, the founder of Human Rights Monitor, was sentenced to 15 years in prison in connection with his rights activities and exercising his right of association. His wife, activist Samar Badawi, was banned from travel in October 2014 and was summoned for questioning more than once due to her rights activities.

In Sudan in December 2014, Amin Makki Madani, the president of the Confederation of Civil Society, and lawyer Farouq Abu Eissa, the president of the National Consensus Forces, were arrested and tried before a special court for terrorism crimes on charges of working to undermine the constitutional order and conspiring against the regime; the Sudanese authorities suspended the trial in March 2015. Two of the most prominent civil society groups in Sudan—the Salema Center for Women’s Rights and the Khatim Adlan
Center for Enlightenment and Human Development—remain closed. The Sudanese Human Rights Monitor faced increasing threats as its offices were stormed and searched, some staff members were arrested, and several of its activities were banned.

Human rights defenders were easy targets for warring parties in areas of armed conflict. In Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria, dozens of human rights activists were assassinated and many more were subjected to enforced disappearance or unlawful detention. In Syria, four human rights defenders—Razan Zaitouneh, her husband Wael Hamadeh, Samira Khalil, and Nazem Hammadi—have been missing since a militia stormed the offices of the Violations Documentation Center in December 2013 and abducted them. Lawyer Khalil Matouq was disappeared in October 2012, and it is suspected that he is being detained in a secret location by the Syrian authorities. In Yemen, rights activist and journalist Abdul Karim Khiwani was assassinated in March 2015 by an unknown armed group, while in Libya activist Salwa Bugaighis was killed in her home in Benghazi in June 2014. In Libya as well activists Tawfik Bensaud and Sami Elkawafi were killed in Benghazi in September 2014, while in February 2015 activist Intisar Hasairi was gunned down in the streets of Tripoli. Her body was found in a boot of a car.

Morocco is no longer a model of tolerance for human rights organizations. The year 2014 saw increasing arbitrary security interventions in the work of local and international rights groups, while several human rights activists were convicted and imprisoned on charges related to their right of expression and peaceful assembly, among them Osama Hassan, Wafaa Sharaf, and Abd al-Khaliq al-Markhi with the Moroccan Association of Human Rights. The Moroccan authorities also refused to license several new rights organizations or local branches of existing groups following security objections to some of the founders. According to the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, the Moroccan authorities arbitrarily banned nearly 80 of its rights activities in 2014. On July 15, Moroccan Interior Minister Mohamed Hassad attacked the rights movement in parliament, accusing it of collaboration, supporting terrorism, and impeding security efforts. In the Western Sahara, Moroccan authorities continued to harass Sahrawi political and rights activists as well as Moroccans advocating Sahrawis right of self-determination, by systematically confiscating the right of peaceful assembly in the province. Such activists were subjected to repeated physical assaults, referred to trials, tortured, and detained for long periods. In addition, their right to work and movement was constrained, their families were harassed, and their contacts with international human rights groups restricted.

Human rights organizations were able to operate with a reasonable degree of freedom and independence in Tunisia and Lebanon, but challenges continue to face activists in these countries. In Tunisia, the security and judicial establishments have not yet been purged of the legacy of the repressive Ben Ali regime. Last year saw several security
attacks on human rights activists with no accountability for the perpetrators. In Lebanon, human rights defenders faced increasing security threats, particularly Syrians living in Lebanon, as a result of the rising security and military influence of forces supporting the Assad regime, represented by Hezbollah. Although most human rights organizations in Lebanon enjoy legal status, the Lebanese authorities continue to reject the establishment of groups defending the rights of sexual minorities or trade federations defending the rights of migrant workers.

**Trampling of human rights on grounds of security and counterterrorism**

Security and counterterrorism legislation again assumed center stage in the Arab region over the last two years. Most of this legislation adopts overly broad, vague definitions of terrorism while mandating stiff penalties for those committing these ill-defined crimes. Such legislation also typically expands the prerogatives of the security apparatus and hence erodes citizens’ civil rights, restricts freedom of the press and civil society, and grants judicial immunity to security forces during operations conducted in the war on terrorism. In the context of the battle against the Muslim Brotherhood currently being waged by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and as part of the counterterrorism legislation in these countries, numerous charitable associations, civic groups, and public figures connected even slightly to the Brotherhood were placed on designated terrorist lists without any evidence proving their involvement in acts of violence or their funding of terrorist groups. These laws were also used in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Sudan, and Jordan to prosecute members of liberal and leftist groups and human rights activists. In Saudi Arabia, for example, Waleed Abu al-Khair, a lawyer and the founder of the Human Rights Monitor, was sentenced to 15 years in prison after being convicted on charges of seeking to overthrow the regime and undermining the monarchy, showing contempt for the judiciary, cooperating with foreign organizations seeking to harm the kingdom, establishing and administering an unlawful organization, and publishing false news likely to harm public security.

**Crackdown on the media and freedom of expression and opinion**

The stalled democratic transitions in the Arab region and the spread of armed conflict were reflected in the erosion of freedom of opinion and expression, in both traditional and new media. In areas of armed conflict in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen, journalists faced serious risks from all parties to these conflicts. Several cases of the killing, abduction, and detention of journalists doing their job were documented. After the Muslim Brotherhood was removed from power in Egypt, numerous Egyptian and foreign journalists were arrested and tried due to their coverage of the Egyptian authorities’ abuses against
demonstrators or for offering coverage of the events unacceptable to the regime. Some 18
journalists are currently in prison in Egypt. The media in Tunisia and Lebanon enjoyed
a greater margin of freedom in 2014, but there were several prosecutions of journalists
and some were physically attacked by the security authorities while doing their job.
Online spaces for freedom of opinion and expression also came under more restrictions
in the Gulf, Egypt, and Lebanon, as several politicians and activists were prosecuted for
their expression of peaceful opinions on social media. Blasphemy laws were also used
to curtail public debate about religion and freedom of belief; they were put to political
use as well to prosecute critics of rulers and the corruption of religious establishments,
especially in the Arab Gulf.

The judiciary as a tool to eliminate political opponents

A prime symptom of the crisis of justice in the Arab region is the transformation of the
courts into spaces for the settling of accounts with political opponents and critics of the
ruling elite. The year 2014 saw numerous trials of opinion and political trials in Egypt,
most of them clearly retaliatory in nature and lacking all due process guarantees. Many
of these trials ended with the sentencing of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood leaders
and supporters to death or life imprisonment. At the same time, dozens of youth activists
known for their defense of human rights and democracy were imprisoned—in some
instances, for life—after being convicted of breaking laws regulating demonstrations and
assembly. In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, human rights defenders and political dissidents
were convicted and imprisoned on charges related to the peaceful expression of opinion,
while in Sudan, leaders of the human rights movement and the political opposition were
tried in special terrorism courts on charges of conspiring against the state.

Another symptom of the crisis of justice is the rule of impunity, as the state and its
judicial bodies fail to investigate serious human rights crimes committed by security and
military bodies. The most prominent example is Egypt, where former president Hosni
Mubarak, former Interior Minister Habib al-Adli, and security leaders were acquitted of
the murder of demonstrators during the uprising in January 2011. According to local and
international observers, the investigation and trial of these figures did not demonstrate
due diligence in the discovery of the truth or bringing justice to the victims.

Hardship of religious and ethnic minorities

Ethnic and religious minorities in the Arab region have endured extreme hardship
over the last four years, a result of the rising influence of extremist religious trends
in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as the collapse of
security organs in many of these states, which has left minorities unprotected and open
to acts of retribution. In Libya, militias in Misrata have forcibly displaced some 40,000 Tawerghans from their lands since 2011, while in Syria, nearly 235 Assyrian Christians have been abducted by the Islamic State in Hassaka. In Iraq, some 5,000 Yezidi men were killed, while nearly 3,000 others, largely Yezidis as well, were kidnapped by IS; some 5,000 Yezidi women and children were abducted and sold as sex slaves in and out of Iraq, and those who have been freed have found no appropriate psychological or social rehabilitation services. In addition, some 85 percent of Yezidis have been expelled from their homes and are currently living in camps lacking adequate humanitarian support. In Egypt, religious currents stepped up incitement against Christians, holding them responsible for the end of Muslim Brotherhood rule in the country. As a result, dozens of Egyptians churches were burned, destroyed, and attacked. Political conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and the Gulf region have brought sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia to unprecedented levels in modern Arab history, exacting a heavy human toll in Iraq and Yemen as a result of acts of sectarian retribution, as central governments failed to devise fundamental solutions to such tensions on the basis of citizenship and equality.

The human rights crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory

The Israeli occupation authorities bear the greatest responsibility for the erosion of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory. In 2014, Palestinian civilians continued to face killing, siege, and intimidation by occupation forces, who continue to enjoy international protection and immunity for crimes against the Palestinian people. More than 2,000 civilians were killed during the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014. Israel is currently arbitrarily detaining more than 5,000 Palestinians, and many of them face unfair military trials. Many prisoners are also harassed and prosecuted for their peaceful activities in defense of human rights, their demands for the right of self-determination, or their resistance to Israel’s unlawful siege and colonization.

Palestinian factions and militias also bear some responsibility for the degraded humanitarian conditions in Palestine. The ongoing political division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has bolstered the climate of exclusion and retaliation among various political factions. This has led to several cases of extrajudicial killing in the Gaza Strip, carried out by militias amid accusations of treason, as well as the spread of arbitrary detention and torture and ill treatment in detention facilities, especially in the Gaza Strip. In addition, politicized trials have ended in death sentences while restrictions are placed on the media and civil society institutions in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinian refugees continue to be denied their right of citizenship and self-determination, as well as their basic social, economic, and cultural rights in refugee camps in various states. Refugees
in Syria in particular have been subjected to another wave of displacement or are living under siege in extremely brutal conditions, as is the case with the Yarmouk camp, located 8 km from Damascus.
First: Reformation issues:

1. Towards a democratic law to end the one-party regime: prepared and edited by Essam El-Din Mohammed Hassan.


3. Elections and political clientelism in Egypt – renewal of the mediators and the return of the voter: Dr. Sarah Ben Nafisa, Dr. Aladdin Arafat, presented by El Sayed Yassin, Nabil Abdel Fattah.


5. Political reformation at the altar of Al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Ammar Ali Hassan, presented by Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Abdel Moneim Said.

6. The Khartoum declaration: the work of the Second Civil Forum parallel to the Arab summit (Arabic and English).


15. Media in the Arab world: between liberalization and the reproduction of domination: Mohamm Qatishat, Abdul Karim Alabdawi, Essam El-Din Mohammed Hassan, presented by Moataz El Fegiery, edited by Essam El-Din Mohammed Hassan.

16. A nation without citizens! Constitutional amendments in the balance: Bahey El Din Hassan, Sal Issa, Dr. Amr Hamzawy, Dr. Mohammed Sayed Said, Moataz El Fegiery, Dr. Huwaida Adly.


18. Movements for democratic change between reality and ambition - experiences of Eastern Europe and the Arab world: Ihab Elzelaki, Dmytro Botikhn, Dusan Ondrosk, Dr. Radwan Ziadeh, Salam Elkawkbi, Saif Nasraoui, Dr. Sherif Younis, Dr. Amr Hamzawy, Amr Abdel-Rahman, Mari Ottway, Dr. Mohamed el-Sayed Said, Mohammed Algomani, presented and edited by Sameh Fawzi.


21. Towards a democratic law for the Liberation of the civil work. Legal and field study: Essam El-I Mohammed Hassan (and others) (Arabic and English).


23. Democratic transition in Syria and the Spanish experience: Edited by Dr. George Irani, Dr. Radwan Ziadeh.
25- Parliamentary republic – the pillar for political and constitutional reformation: Salah Eissa, I Amr Elshobaki.
26- Prospects of the political reformation in the Arab world – a parallel meeting of the Future Forum presented by Sally Sami (in Arabic and English).
28- Towards creating a vision for the independence and integrity of the Egyptian judiciary (in Arabic and English).
29- Fall of the barriers - human rights in the Arab world: the annual report 2011.
30- Criminalizing the Egyptian Revolution: Mohamed Zaree, Mohamed Al-Ansary; Ed. Ragab Saad
31- When Political Islam Rules; The Case of Sudan: Haider Ibrahim Ali.

Second: human rights debates:
2- Palestinian political culture - democracy and human rights: Mohammed Khalid Alazar, Ahmad Si Eldajani, Abdel Qader Yassim, Azmi Bishara, Mahmoud Shkirat.
4- Guarantees of the rights of the Palestinian refugees and the current political settlement Mohammed Khalid Alazar, Salim Tamari, Salah Eldin Amer, Abbass Shibliak, Abdul Alim Muhammm: Abdul Qader Yassim.
5- Struggling democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia: Gamal Abdel Gawad, Abul Ela Madi, Ab Ghaffar Shukr, Moncef Marzouki, Wahid Abdel Meguid.
6- The rights of women between the international conventions and political Islam: Omar Alaqi Ahmad Subhi Mansour, Mohamed Abdoul Jabbar, Ghanem Jawad, Mohammed Abdul Malik almutawakkil, Heba Raouf Ezzat, a unique debate, Albaqir Alaffif.
9- Islam and democracy: edited by Sayed Ismail Daifallah, presented by Helmi Salem.

Third: Intellectual initiatives:
1- Sectarianism and human rights: Violet Dagher (Lebanon).
2- The victim and the executioner: Haytham Manna (Syria).
3- Guarantees of civil and political rights in the Arab constitutions: Fateh Azzam (Palestine) (in Arabic and English).
4- Human rights in the Arab and Islamic culture: Haytham Manna (in Arabic and English).
5- Human rights, the right to participate, and the duty of dialogue: Dr. Ahmed Abdullah.
6- Human Rights - the new visions: Moncef Marzouki (Tunisia).
7- Challenges of the Arab Movement for Human Rights: edited by Bahey El Din Hassan (in Arabic and English).
8- Criticism of the 1971 constitution and a call for a new constitution: Ahmed Abdel Hafiz.
9- Children and war - the case of Yemen: Alaa Kaoud, Abdul Rahman Abdul Khalilq, Nadra Abdul Qudus.
10- Citizenship in the Arab and Islamic history: Dr. Haytham Manna. (in Arabic and English).
11- Palestinian refugees and the peace process - a statement against apartheid: Dr. Mohammed Hai Jacob (Palestine).
12- Takfir (apostasy) between religion and politics: Muhammad Yunus, presented by Dr. Abdel Muti Bayoumi.
13- Islamic fundamentalism and human rights: Dr. Haytham Manna.
14- The lawyers’ syndicate crisis: Abdullah Khalil, presented by Abdul Ghaffar Shukr.
15- Allegations of state law in Tunisia: Dr. Haytham Manna.
16- Progressive Islamists: Salahuddin Aljourchi.
17- Women’s rights in Islam: Dr. Haytham Manna.
18- Constitution in the dustbin: Salah Issa, presented by Chancellor Awad Elmurr.
19- Palestine/Israel: Peace or racist regime: Marwan Bishara, presented by Mohamed Hassanein Heika.
20- Al-Aqsa uprising: lessons of the first year: Dr. Ahmed Yussef Alqarai.
21- The price of freedom - on the sidelines of the intellectual and social battles in modern Egypti history: Mahmoud Elwardani.
22- Ideology and bars - towards humanizing the Arab nationalist ideology: Hani Ncirh.
23- Silencer culture: Helmi Salem.
24- Militants under the sheikhs cloak - Islamic fundamentalism before and after 1952: Talat Radwan.
25- Plan for constitutional reform in Egypt: Abdel Khalek Farouk, presented by Dr. Mohamed Elsayed Said.
26- Culture is not fine: Ahmed Abdel Muti Hijazi.
27- Intellectual against authority: Radwan Ziadeh.
28- Islam, democracy and globalization: Nabil Abdel Fattah.
29- Democracy in the thoughts of the Egyptian renaissance pioneers: Nabil Farag.
30- Towards establishing the rules of justice, peace and equity in Darfur: Sadiq Almahdi, presented Mohammed Fayek.

Fourth: Ibn Rushd notes:
2- Renewal of political thought within the framework of democracy and human rights – Islamis Marxism and Nationalism: presented by Mohamed Sayed Ahmed, edited by Essam Mohamed Hass (in Arabic and English).
4- The human rights crisis in Algeria: Dr. Ibrahim Awad and others.
5- The “Kusheh” crisis - between the sanctity of the nation and the dignity of the citizen: present and edited by Essam El-Din Mohammed Hassan.
6- Al-Aqsa uprising diaries: in defense of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian peop prepared and presented by Essam Eldin Mohammed Hassan.

Fifth: Human rights education:
1- How do university students think on human rights? (a file includes research prepared by scholar under the supervision of the center - in the first training session 1994 for education on research in t field of human rights).
2- Papers of the first conference for young researchers on cognitive research in the field of hum rights (a file containing research prepared by scholars - under the supervision of the center - in t second training session 1995 for education on research in the field of human rights).
4- International and regional committees for the protection of human rights: Mohammed An Almidani.
5- Man is the origin - entrance to the international humanitarian law and human rights: Ab Hussein Shaaban.
6- The bet on knowledge - on the issues of education and dissemination of human rights: Alba Alafif, and Essam Eldin Mohammed Hassan.
7- The inherent and the acquired - economic, social and cultural rights: Alaa Kaoud.
9- The rights of women - from the local work to the global change: Dr. Amal Abdel-Hadi.
11- The independence of the judiciary: Dr. Sherif Younis.
12- The new social movements: Farid Zahran.
13- The independence of the university: Khloud Saber.
15- The right to bodily integrity: Dr. Magda Adly (second edition).
16- Elections in Egypt: Amr Abdel Rahman.
17- Women’s rights: Ahmed Zaki Osman.
18- Non-governmental organizations: Dr. Youssry Mustafa (second edition).

Human rights for women: between international recognition and reservations of Arab states: Alhabib Alhamdoni, Hafiza Shoukair, presented by Farida Elnaqash.


European conventions for the protection of human rights: translated and presented by Dr. Mohammed Amin Almidani, Dr. Nazih Kasipi.

The march to find knowledge and enlightenment: Nabil Faraj.

Brief history of freedom - the story of the birth of human rights and the citizen: Muhammad Yunis.

Sixth: University theses for human rights:

1- The control of the constitutionality of laws - a comparative study between the United States and Egypt: Dr. Hesham Mohamed Fawzi, Dr. Mohammed Mirghani Khiry (second edition).
2- Political tolerance - cultural foundations of civil society in Egypt: Dr. Huwaida Adly.
3- Human rights guarantees at the regional level: Dr. Mustafa Abdul Ghaffar.
4- Journalists and democracy in the nineties - democratic energy wasted: Von Korff York, reviewed and translated Magdi Alnaeem, presented by Dr. Mohamed Elsayed Said.
5- Arab state in the wind - a study on the political thoughts of Burhan Ghalioun: Abdul Salam Tawe Dr. Nevin Mousad.
6- Education and citizenship - the reality of civil education in the Egyptian school: Mustafa Qasi Dr. Ahmed Youssef Saad.
7- The road for Egypt to self-acceptance - sectarian tension and the sins of public and Azhari education: Khalid Osman, Dr. Mohamed Selim Al-Awa, Anba Dr. youhna klta.
8- Fiqh of literary and intellectual trials - a study on the discourse and interpretation: Dr. Wali Slouai.
9- Citizenship and globalization – the difficult time question: Dr. Kaid Diab.

Seventh: Women’s initiatives:

1- The attitude of doctors to female genital mutilation: Amal Abdel Hadi / Seham Abdul Salam (in Arabic and English).
2- No retreat - the struggle of an Egyptian village to eradicate female genital mutilation: Amal Abd Hadi (in Arabic and English).
3- Family honor crime: Janan Abdu (Palestine 48).
4- Gardens of women - in the criticism of fundamentalism: Farida Elnaqash.

Eighth: Human rights studies:

2- The human cost of the Arab conflicts: Ahmed Touhami.
5- Security conditions in contemporary Egypt: Abdel Wahab Bakr.
6- The encyclopedia of legislation in the Arab press: Abdullah Khalil.
7- Towards reforming the science of religion - Azhar education as a model: Alaa Kaoud, presented by Nabil Abdel Fattah.
8- Businessmen - democracy and human rights: Dr. Mohamed Elsayed Said.
9- About imamate and politics – the historical discourse in the science beliefs: Dr. Ali Mabrouk.
10- Modernity between the Basha and the General: Dr. Ali Mabrouk.
11- Mahmoud Azmi... Pioneer of human rights in Egypt: Hani Noir, presented by Dr. Mohamed Elsay Said.
12- Sudanese legislation in the balance of human rights: Gamal Altoum, presented by Mahgob Ibrah Babker.
13- Beyond Darfur: Identity and the civil war in Sudan: Albaqir Alafif, translated by Mohammed Suleiman.
Ninth: Human rights in arts and literature:
4. Claiming the right art - contemporary Egyptian theatre and human rights: Nora Amin.
5. Cinema and people's rights: Hashim Elnahass and others.
6. The other in the folk culture - folklore and human rights: Sayed Ismail, presented by Dr. Ahm Morsi.
7. More than a sky - the diversity of religious sources in the poetry of Mahmoud Darwish: Sal Sami.
8. The sacred and the beautiful - the differences and similarities between religion and art: I Hassan Teleb.
9. Hammurabi's grievances - Poems for the freedom of Iraq: prepared by Helmi Salem, Dr. Ferial Jabouri Ghazol.
12. Negative - from the memory of female politicians detainees: Rosa Yassin Hassan.
13. The “Naked Lunch” Before American Courts: Ramsis Awad.

Tenth: Non-periodical publications:
1. "Equal": a monthly newsletter. [93 issues released]
2. Arab gallery: a research journal. [68 issues released]
3. Different visions: non-periodical magazine in cooperation with the MERIP magazine. [11 issues released]
4. Reproductive health issues: non-periodical magazine in cooperation with the Reproductive Health Matters magazine. [3 issues released]

Eleventh: Movements issues:
1. Arabs between repression inside and injustice abroad: presented and edited by Bahey Eldin Hassan. (in Arabic, English and French)
2. Enabling the vulnerable: prepared by Magdy Naeem.
4. The Cairo declaration to teach and spread the culture of human rights: issued by the conference the issues of teaching and spreading the culture of human rights: an agenda for the twenty-first century Cairo 13 - 16 October 2000.
7. Israeli confessions - we are thugs and racists: prepared by Mohamed Elsayed, translated by Swlaf Taha.
8. The Cairo declaration against racism: (in English and Arabic).
10. Terrorism and human rights after September 11 (in English).
11. The bridge of return - the rights of Palestinian refugees under the settlement paths: presented a edited by Essam Eldin Mohammed Hassan.
13. Racism under siege - the preparatory work of the Cairo conference of the world conference against racism: presented and edited by Salah Abu Nar.
14. The Beirut declaration of the regional protection of human rights in the Arab world (in Arabic and English).
17. The second Independence: Towards an initiative for political reformation in the Arab States (Arabic, English and French).
18- Priorities and mechanisms of reformation in the Arab world (in Arabic, English and French).
19- The Rabat declaration: civil society conference statement parallel to the "Forum for the Future" (in Arabic and English).
20- The media and the presidential election: evaluating the performance of the media in covering the campaigns of candidates (17 August - 4 September) (in Arabic and English).
21- The media and the parliamentary elections in Egypt: evaluating the performance of the media covering the campaigns of candidates (27 October - 3 December) (in Arabic and English).
22- Sudan and the International Criminal Court: the mix of the initial with the incidental: Kar Algazouli. (Second edition).
24- Freedom of the media and the elections integrity: collection of documents about the international standards of human rights.
25- What is the role for the media in the coverage of the general election? Guide on domestic and international practices: prepared by Giovanna Maiula, Sobhi Asilah.
26- The media and the parliamentary elections in Egypt: evaluating the performance of the media covering the campaigns of candidates (27 October - 15 December 2010) (in Arabic and English).
27- The challenges of democratic transition in Egypt during the transitional phase: edited by A Abdel Rahman.

Twelfth: Joint publications:

a) In collaboration with the National Commission for non-governmental organizations:
   1- Female genital mutilation (FGM) - illusions and facts: Dr. Siham Abdul Salam.
   2- Female genital mutilation: Amal Abdel Hadi.

b) In collaboration with the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (citizen)
   - Problems of stumbling democratic transition in the Arab world: edited by Dr. Mohamm Sayed Said, Dr. Azmi Bishara (Palestine).

c) In collaboration with the Group for Democratic Development and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights
   - For the liberation of civil society: draft law on associations and private institutions.

d) in collaboration with UNESCO
   - Human rights education guide for primary and secondary education (preliminary version)

e) In collaboration with the Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights

f) In collaboration with the Organization of Justice Africa
   - When there is peace - a date with the trinity of democracy, development and peace Sudan: edited by Yoaness Agawin, Alex Duval.

g) In collaboration with 15 independent human rights organization
   - Human Rights in Egypt: a history of injustice, prevarication and hypocrisy (in English) (UPR)