Ibn Rushd Salon: Can Syria Avoid Transitioning to Another Dictatorial Regime?

In Human Rights Dissemination Program, Salon Ibn Rushd by CIHRS

Coinciding with discussions about a national dialogue conference aimed at shaping Syria’s transitional period, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies hosted its monthly Ibn Rushd Salon, focusing on the topic: ‘How Can Syria Avoid Transitioning to Another Dictatorial Regime?’ The event highlighted challenges facing Syria during its political transformation and explored how the national dialogue conference could genuinely reflect the aspirations of all active Syrian civil factions, avoiding its use as a tool to reinforce the interests of the current authority and its allies. It also addressed key considerations regarding the restructuring of the transitional government after the term of the current ‘one-voice’ government expires in early March.

The salon hosted Dr. Hazem Nahar, Editor-in-Chief of Rawaq Maysaloon for Political and Cultural Studies; Mr. Fadel Abdul Ghany, Founder and Chairman of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, and Dr. Marwan Kabalan, Director of Policy Studies at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies. The discussion was moderated by academic and human rights expert Dr. Moataz El Fegiery.

At the beginning of the seminar, Nahar emphasised that Syria is at an exceptional and pivotal moment. However, what is known so far about the national dialogue conference does not suggest a recognition of the dialogue’s importance or the scale of the challenges at hand. The conference’s arrangements lack credibility and practicality, with no information available about the date, the preparatory committee, its composition, or the criteria for selecting its members. Furthermore, remaining unclear is the role of civil society organisations and political forces in the dialogue. Reports have also surfaced indicating that 1,200 people have been invited to participate, raising serious concerns about the conference’s effectiveness. How can such a large number reach decisions or outline pathways that match the gravity of the current challenges within just three days?

In this context, Kabalan warned of grave consequences if the conference fails, particularly the risk of participants being unable to reach a clear political consensus—an outcome likely given the proposed number of attendees. Such failure would carry a heavy political cost that Syria cannot afford and could push the country back into a cycle of violence. Kabalan also criticised the lack of clarity regarding the conference’s core objective, suggesting that it currently appears as merely an attempt by the new authorities to gain legitimacy before Syria’s diverse society and to demonstrate inclusivity and fairness to the international community. However, the conference’s purpose extends far beyond this. Syria urgently needs a clear roadmap, and proving inclusivity must be reflected in the formation of the new government, constitutional provisions that guarantee the rights of all citizens, and legal frameworks that ensure protection from the oppression of any authority. This conference should be the first step toward establishing such foundations, rather than a means to legitimise a ruling body lacking genuine authority in the absence of a constitution, parliament, and the ability to hold elections. He added, ‘So far, the new leadership has presented no clear vision for the transitional period, only scattered ideas and concepts without coherence or a guiding framework’.

On the other hand, Abdul Ghany criticised the timing of the national dialogue, stating, ‘Perhaps a national dialogue is not the first step we need. What we need first is a transitional governing body that truly represents the entire population, issues a temporary constitutional declaration, and then initiates a broad national dialogue on essential legislative reforms and mechanisms for rebuilding state institutions’. He warned of the dangers of a single entity or political faction monopolising the invitation to dialogue or controlling the formation of its preparatory committee, as this would seriously undermine the diversity and representation of Syria’s civil actors in both the dialogue and its outcomes.

Abdul Ghany also criticised the international community’s reluctance to lift sanctions imposed on Syria, as he links their lifting to political progress. He argued that, from a legal perspective, these sanctions were initially imposed to deter Bashar al-Assad’s regime and in response to its crimes, and therefore, they should be lifted automatically with the fall of that regime. While acknowledging that new aid, investments, and international reconstruction efforts are understandably tied to the nature and direction of the new ruling authority—consistent with global practices—he stressed that ‘sanctions are a different matter.’

Kabalan, in turn, highlighted the positive impact of lifting sanctions on achieving social peace and improving citizens’ living conditions, emphasising that economic stability is the primary safeguard against renewed waves of violence and chaos driven by the population’s desperate need for basic necessities, which are currently lacking in Syria. He warned that the severity of Syria’s economic challenges is no less critical than the difficulties of rebuilding state institutions and defining a political course.

Another major challenge discussed was transitional justice. The speakers unanimously stressed the need for accountability and justice for victims, even if the authorities are currently unable to offer financial compensation. Nahar emphasised that this issue should not be controlled by any current or future authority but rather handled by an independent body capable of operating free from political pressures and compromises. Abdul Ghany further clarified that this body should include national legal experts, judges, and broad representation from victims’ families and survivors. It would be responsible for coordinating with the ruling authorities to ensure harm is addressed and victims are compensated.

However, Abdul Ghany criticised the current leadership’s rhetoric for its lack of focus on justice and accountability for victims, which sends a concerning message to millions of victims that their rights, compensation, and justice are not priorities. He warned that such neglect could fuel calls for vengeance and the use of violence as a means of reclaiming rights outside legal frameworks. He called for disclosure of the truth, revealing the whereabouts of forcibly disappeared persons, and prosecuting top- and mid-level leaders of the Assad regime through a national judicial system paired with political messaging that promises justice, accountability, and redress for the victims. He added, ‘Even if the ruling authority turns a blind eye to these rights, civil society organisations must take the lead, refuse to compromise on justice, and challenge impunity’.

At the conclusion of the event, the speakers stressed the importance of Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s decision to dissolve Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, as its continued existence has lost its justification. Ending this chapter of armed violence, they argued, would mark a clear break from the past. They suggested forming a new political party or joining an existing one that distances itself from the rhetoric and actions of some current HTS members, reflecting Al-Sharaa’s relatively positive new discourse that has provided reassurances to various segments of the Syrian population as well as regional and international actors.

The speakers closed with the question: Will Al-Sharaa seize what they described as the current regional and international consensus against allowing Syria to slide back into chaos?

Watch the full seminar here:

Share this Post