On 4 March, a new Arab summit was hosted in Cairo with an agenda focused on the recently announced ‘Trump Plan,’ which involves the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, as well as a plan to reconstruct Gaza. To discuss these developments, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) organized its monthly Ibn Rushd Salon on Tuesday, 11 March 2025, titled: Does the Arab Summit Represent a Turning Point in Arab States’ Foreign Relations Management Mechanisms? The session featured Dr. Marwan Kabalan, a Syrian academic and Director of Policy Studies at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, and Dr. Hassan Nafaa, an Egyptian writer and professor of political science at Cairo University.
The discussion began with a question regarding the extent to which the recent decisions of the Arab Summit are applicable in light of the current conditions of Arab countries. These decisions included the rejection of Trump’s plan, Egypt’s plan for Gaza reconstruction, and Arab states’ adherence to the two-state solution. While acknowledging the importance of these decisions, Dr. Nafaa considered that the Arab summit overall was a disappointment to the people of Arab countries. This is especially true given that the Arab Summit only convened after Trump’s statements about displacing Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan; for over a year, no ordinary or emergency Arab summit session has yet been called to respond to Israel’s ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people. It was only when Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia felt a direct threat to their interests following the displacement of Palestinians that the summit was convened. Perhaps these states also finally realized that the Greater Israel project is a tangible project that continues to concretely advance toward realization. This reflects how Arab states’ priorities have shifted to focus on managing their immediate interests rather than maintaining unified Arab positions on major issues.
Nafaa added: ‘It is true that the summit decisions challenged Trump’s plan and proposed an Arab alternative—another scenario for displacement and a reconstruction plan within a shorter timeframe. But the key question remains: will the Arab world be able to confront the United States and Israel, impose this alternative Arab project, and defeat Trump’s project?’
Dr. Kabalan, for his part, commented that Trump’s administration is among the most pro-Israel American administrations in history, and that efforts to control Gaza had already begun during Trump’s first term. At that time, Arab positions were very weak; four Arab countries even announced normalization of their relations with Israel between Trump’s first and second terms. This latest Arab movement came only after Trump’s plan threatened the national security of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. They realized that Trump approaches Gaza with the mindset of a real estate developer pursuing profit and investment, with no concern even for the political dimensions of his proposal.
Nevertheless, Kabalan believes that Arab states could, if they chose, confront the displacement plan. Even the threat of cutting American aid to Egypt and Jordan would not have a significant impact; U.S. aid to Egypt is not comparable to the size of grants and assistance Egypt receives from Gulf countries, for example. In fact, the United States also needs Egypt and Jordan as the benefit is mutual, as evidenced by the quick retraction of Trump’s threat to stop aid to Egypt. Kabalan continued: ‘But we have become accustomed to Arab summit decisions not being worth the ink they are written with. For instance, since last November’s summit, Arab countries decided to break the siege on Gaza, yet to this day the siege continues to this day.’
Arab consensus in confronting the American plan is not the only obstacle; a greater challenge precedes it: Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation. Both guests agreed that the ongoing conflict between Palestinian factions could obstruct any Arab plan to confront the displacement scheme. According to Nafaa: ‘The unity of the Palestinian national movement, through a national consensus government agreed upon by all factions to govern both Gaza Strip and the West Bank, is the first step in confronting the displacement plan.’ He continued: ‘The Flood of Al-Aqsa [Toofan Al-Aqsa] was used as a justification for advancing an Israeli-American plan that has its roots and has enjoyed consensus for years. Without internal Palestinian agreement on political unity between the West Bank and Gaza, attempts to erase the foundations of an independent, unified Palestinian state will only gain momentum.’
Similarly, Kabalan viewed Palestinian reconciliation as the first step toward confronting the Israeli plan, not just the displacement proposal, but all ongoing U.S.-Israeli efforts to eliminate the very idea of a Palestinian state and abandon the two-state solution. Kabalan added: ‘Unfortunately, we cannot rely on an Arab project or a unified Arab force to confront Israeli threats, given that Arab regimes neither represent the aspirations of their peoples nor care for their needs and security. These regimes are more concerned with protecting their wealth and staying in power than with national or societal security. It is regrettable, but we cannot count on them.’
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